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Abstract
In the former planned economies, a major result of the economic reform programs
has been the resurgence of private entrepreneurship. As these countries have struggled to make the transition to a market-based economy over the past decade, the
environment has played an important structural role in entrepreneurial development. However, from a psychological perspective, the environmental structural context affects human action through cognitive processes such as self-regulation. Thus,
we first identify and analyze the effect of the political, economic, legal, and cultural
environment on the development of entrepreneurship in transitional economies,
mainly using the former Soviet Union and particularly the Republic of Kazakhstan
as an example. We then examine the role that social cognitive variables such as selfefficacy may play in the relationship between this external environment and entrepreneurial development.

The Eastern European countries in general and the former Soviet
Union republics of Central Asia in particular have experienced drastic political, economic, and social changes in the transition from a
planned to a market economy. However, few former Soviet republics
have carried out such far-reaching change in so short a time as Kazakhstan, which has attracted substantial amounts of international
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investment because of its rich natural resources. As a result, Kazakhstan has gone further than most of the countries in that region in introducing reforms to try to stabilize its economy (Beddoes, 1998; Safari, 1997; Taylor, 1997). A by-product of these initiatives, is a new,
but struggling, entrepreneurial sector.
Johnson and Loveman (1995) found that the formation of entrepreneurial startup ventures is the most effective way to relocate labor
and capital in a transitionary economy. However, these researchers
also found difficulties with increasing efficiency of privatized former
state assets and demonopolization. This is because, in most transformational economies, the capital stock of the old state enterprises often turned out to be worth less than anticipated. Even the sheer number of state firms that have to be privatized poses too great a challenge
for the vulnerable institutional infrastructure of these countries (Peng
& Heath, 1996).
At the same time, entrepreneurial development in transitional economies, with the exception of the Central European countries and of
course China, has been held back by a combination of factors such
as resistance to change in the prevailing bureaucratic-administrative
business culture, underdeveloped legal and financial infrastructure,
considerable administrative discretion and corruption in different government offices, restrictive taxation, high interest rates, inflation, and
lack of management expertise and skills (Connor, 1991; Kaser, 1995;
Kornai, 1995). Thus, the success of former Soviet and especially Central Asian entrepreneurs have been and are continuing to be shaped
by these environmental factors.
There are only a few empirical studies on the history of the entrepreneurship in imperial and Soviet Russia that have relevance to the
entrepreneurial development in transformational economies (Guroff
& Castensen, 1983; Wilken, 1979). This is important background information because the traditional Russian culture was one of the key
factors shaping the business culture in the rest of the former Soviet
Union. In fact, Armstrong (1983) noted that the values and perceptions of the dominant Russian ethnic elite considering the dynamics
of entrepreneurial activity generalized among non-Russians in the Soviet Union. There have been a number of studies that have examined
recent changes in Russian business culture and management (Lawrence & Vlachoutsicos, 1990; Luthans, Welsh, & Rosenkrantz, 1993;
Puffer, 1994; Welsh, Luthans, & Sommer, 1993), but, to date, there
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have been only a very few studies examining Russian entrepreneurship (Caveman, Welsh, & Bushmarin, 1995; Connor, 1991; McCarthy,
Puffer, & Shekshin, 1993). Moreover, except one study comparing entrepreneurship in Russia with the West (Caveman, Welsh, & Bushmarin, 1995), there are no published studies we are aware of that examine entrepreneurship in other former Soviet Union countries such as
in Central Asia. Thus, there is clearly a growing need for comprehensive analysis of entrepreneurship in Central Asia.
This article has two main purposes. First, we identify and describe
the environmental factors that have major impact on the development
of entrepreneurial new ventures in transitional economies, with emphasis on Central Asia and in particular Kazakhstan. We recognize that
these countries are not the same as other transitional economies, but
believe that they can represent an example for the analysis of the role
that environment can play in entrepreneurial development.
Second, we analyze the social cognitive variables that may mediate the impact of the environmental forces on entrepreneurial development and suggest new directions for future research and practice.

Environment and Entrepreneurial Development
The environment is an important initial factor in influencing the
strategy, structure, and processes of any organized endeavor, including entrepreneurial startups. Given its immediate and salient influence, it follows that the study of entrepreneurship should logically
start with the analysis of the external environment. In particular, Aldrich & Wiedenmayer (1993) suggest that the sociopolitical environment may be so powerful to create or destroy entrepreneurship in a
country. This importance of the environment is explained by successful entrepreneurial ventures better “fit” their environments, maximizing the benefits of exchange with them (Naman & Slevin, 1993).
Covin & Slevin (1989) also consider environmental factors to be a
reasonable starting point for any analysis of entrepreneurship. They
argue that external variables moderate the relationship between entrepreneurial posture and firm performance. They also point out some
major limitations of the environmental variables in entrepreneurship
models. Covin & Slevin (1989) state that the external environment
can be operationally defined in terms of forces or elements that are
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too numerous to incorporate in a specific sense into a single model.
The result is an entrepreneurial model that is not as prescriptive as
it may be.
Bloodgood, Sapienza, & Carsrud (1995) specifically identify some of
the environmental factors potentially affecting entrepreneurial behavior (family and support systems, financing sources, employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, government agencies, and the
cultural, political, and economic environment). According to Stinchcombe (1965), environmental forces probably have their greatest effect
when a new form of organization is emerging (i.e., an entrepreneurial start-up) constraining and imprinting the new form in distinctive
ways. Certain types of infrastructure such as those found in centrally
planned economies might actually inhibit entrepreneurship or even
render it an illegal activity. Interestingly, some forms of entrepreneurial activities, despite all the obstacles, have developed in some sectors
of formerly planned economies where the government had fewer restrictions (e.g., small-scale farming).
Recent changes in the environmental conditions of transforming
countries have made entrepreneurial behaviors legitimate and thus
promoted the founding of new ventures. While the transition from a
planned economy to a market -based economy represents a major paradigm shift, the formal constraints embodied in the old political, legal, and administrative environment unfortunately still dominate the
current environment for entrepreneurial development.

Social Context for Entrepreneurship in Central Asia
Political and Economic Environment
The major feature of planned economies is the comprehensive use
of central economic planning and top-down bureaucratic control. In
other words, the key characteristics of the Russian communist system were the dominant position of the state (the party) and the preponderance of bureaucratic coordination. This structure in essence
represented a vertical state (party) control over enterprises and their
resources. As Gerschenkron (1962) has shown many years ago, the
lower the economic development of a country relative to the more advanced nations, the greater the tendency for the state to dominate the
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economy. As stated above, the state’s control was of major importance
in shaping the nature of business in the former Soviet Union. However,
after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the move to a market economy
has changed the political and economic landscape in terms of the void
in established and stable political power and authority.
Conflict and Carryover
The reminiscing practices of the past such as the dominance of
personal over institutional control in politics and the lack of organized democratic forces, made the reconstruction of the political and
economic environment at best contradictory and inconsistent, and
at worst chaotic and destructive. Clearly, the nature of the reforms
in former communist countries have not yet managed to address the
fundamental conflict between the traditional administrative, bureaucratic structures and private ownership. The structural heritage of socialism is in many ways fundamentally incompatible with new market
changes, which makes reform become a partial and lengthy process.
For example, despite new forms of economic activities now allowed
by state authorities, the postcommunist governments (many of which
consists of the same people and same thinking, only with changed
rhetoric) still have countless administrative and ideological instruments to control not only the state, but also the private sector. In general, methods of control have not really weakened since the communist period (Kornai, 1995). Under Russian communism, all types of
private economic activity were considered to be illegal, whereas in
the postcommunist period the absence of well-designed policies and
infrastructure to support the private sector often forces fledgling entrepreneurs to quit their business early on.
The experiences of former Soviet countries demonstrate that during the initial stages of the transition to a market economy, entrepreneurship as source of economic growth is not only unsupported, but it
is largely neglected and even suppressed. Bureaucratic structures and
regional and sectoral interest groups unfortunately remain intact from
the old days. This is making it even more difficult to restructure the
economy and transform the economic system. The idea of controlled
distribution and redistribution of state resources still dominates the
governments in former Soviet countries, with little attention paid to
the private sector in general and entrepreneurship in particular.
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Stifling Entrepreneurial Development
Entrepreneurial activity in general carries a high risk of failure,
and existing transitionary government bureaucracies are not providing the necessary incentives for people to take such risks. Specifically,
the transitionary governments are directly or indirectly responsible
for: (1) the absence of a competitive environment and a coherent strategy to benefit the entrepreneurial sector, (2) contradictory laws and
regulations and numerous licensing requirements, (3) administrative
discretion, (4) the repressive state of taxation, and (5) the prohibitive
high-interest, short-term loans. For example, early on in the transformation, a survey of 149 new ventures in Kazakhstan found that the
primary problems entrepreneurs indicated were all government-related: taxation, lack of legal guarantees, red tape, the nonconvertible
currency, the breakup of CIS, and lack of clarity in government policy (Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 1993). This inherent conflict and carryover from the old regime inhibits a political and economic environment necessary for successful entrepreneurial development.
Legal Environment
The very essence of entrepreneurship under a market economy is
the autonomy or freedom to conduct business. Entrepreneurs need
to have discretion over resources for the purpose of introducing new
ideas that are limited only by the ability to convince holders of capital that by investing in a venture they can expect a higher return than
elsewhere. Central to this entrepreneurial process is wide dispersion
of the ownership of capital by investors seeking to put it to the most
profitable use. However, if the ownership of the society’s capital is
centralized, the ensuing bureaucratization saps entrepreneurship of
all of its vitality. The need to reform these bureaucratic controls and
encourage private ownership and entrepreneurship in the new market economies requires fundamental changes in the institutional legal framework.
Commercial Laws
An adequate and efficient system of commercial laws has yet to be
developed in transitional economies. The necessary legal framework
of a market economy such as a well-defined property rights are still
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lacking in these economies (Peng & Heath, 1996). For example, the
World Bank has reported four major problems of Kazakh business law:
(1) significant gaps in the development of contract law, secured transactions, and intellectual property law, (2) a number of new laws fall
short of the requirements of a market economy, (3) laws are not mutually consistent, (4) the dichotomy between the law and its implementation where judicial and enforcement reforms have not yet been
agreed on. Without a legal regulatory framework, both efficiency and
equity are adversely affected and crime and corruption are encouraged. Under these circumstances, potential entrepreneurs may believe
that the new system is not on their side because entrepreneurs are
not protected form the powerful old party holdovers and new criminal outfits. Not surprisingly, international investors do not believe that
they have a sufficient degree of protection and legal stability to warrant their involvement and risk their capital. Property Rights Difficulties with property rights lead to high costs of conducting business.
For example, laws on ownership adopted in the former Soviet countries do not specifically address property rights. This creates a risk of
property loss that is a substantial entry barrier for prospective entrepreneurs and potential outside investors in new ventures. The major
stumbling blocks are uncertainty as to the actual owners of property
and what transactions are legal. There are a wide variety of restrictions that render much private activity clearly illegal, and little hope
of state enforcement of private contracts. Together, these obstacles
make it difficult, if not impossible, to enter enforceable, legally binding business agreements.
Personal Discretion
Another barrier for entrepreneurial development is the vast amount
of discretion (“rule by man” rather than “rule by law”) that is still
available to political leaders and bureaucratic administrators (Olson,
1992). Arbitrary enforcement and erratic administration of laws inherited from the past act as barriers to new venture investment and
entrepreneurial activity because government departments are poorly
coordinated. Very often unclear legal statements are used by bureaucrats at every level to extort a payment by a potential entrepreneur.
Each one tries to collect their own fees, which have become a significant source of income for very poorly paid government employees. The
more complex the procedure of registration or licensing new ventures,
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the easier it is for numerous governmental bureaucrats to abuse their
power and impose their own discretion and complications for a new
entrepreneurial venture.
The political and administrative discretion not only invites corruption, but also generates needless uncertainty, makes individual planning by potential entrepreneurs more difficult, and leaves individual
and property rights less secure. According to a Russian study, in the
spring of 1994 all levels of taxation, from local to federal, accounted
for 80 to 90% of reported profits from private businesses (Nelson &
Kuzes, 1995). Taxation bodies follow mainly not a law, but self-serving interpretations of instructions, keeping in mind maximum profit
for the budget. The tax police in Kazakhstan, aware of what is happening in Russia, is interested in maximizing “the extortion” of profits and imposing penalties, because the rewards of tax officers depend
on the amount “returned” to the state fund. As reported in the Central Asia Monitor, (1995, p. 15), “The arbitrariness of officials is aggravated by an inefficient court system, which is corrupt and depends on
local executives. It is useless to put a state body on trial (government,
custom, tax inspection) because, typically, the court decision would
be to maintain the status quo.”
Fast Pace of Change
Government regulations concerning private economic activity are
changing at a dizzying pace. Legal agreements today may be illegal
or heavily taxed tomorrow. It is nearly impossible to even discern today’s laws, regulations, and taxes, for they are often contradictory. All
of this uncertainty over ownership and what transactions are legal exacts a heavy toll on entrepreneurial development.
The International Tax and Investment Center, a Washington-based,
nonprofit organization conducted a survey at the request of the Kazakh government to research and advise how Kazakhstan could attract
private investment. The organization surveyed major Western companies to determine reforms the Kazakh government could make in
order to create an investor-friendly situation. Although in July 1995
Kazakhstan enacted its first tax code, which was called very “pro-investment,” international investors noted that the investment climate,
although promising, is also highly volatile. Companies listed various
barriers to investment such as (1) bureaucracy, (2) financial risk, (3)

L u t h a n s , S ta j k o v i c & S ta j k o v i c i n J o u r n a l o f W o r l d B u s i n e s s 3 5 ( 2 0 0 0 )

9

the tax and fiscal regime of the country, (4) the legal infrastructure
and pace of legal change, and (5) exchange controls (BNA International Business & Finance Daily, 1996).
An Old Elite as a New Entrepreneurial Class
Networking in the organizational behavior field means knowing the
right people, making connections to get something accomplished, and
working together with people from within a system to reach common
objectives. In the strategy literature, networking is defined as a firm’s
effort to establish long-term relationships with other firms to obtain
and sustain a competitive advantage. Firms form loosely structured
networks without clear governance mechanisms to coordinate activities, pool resources, and pursue joint growth (Jarillo, 1989).
In the absence of an adequate legal framework, financial markets,
and political stability, informal constraints play a larger role in regulating economic exchanges in transitionary economies (North, 1990).
Networking and personal trust become more important during the
transition because they offer some consistency and predictability in
times of fundamental change in the formal institutional frameworks.
Engaging in extensive networking activities based on personal contacts and informal agreements through a great deal of trust building,
gift giving, and/or bribery “stabilizes” economic activities in a volatile and uncertain environment.
The analyses of contemporary former Soviet societies have led many
Western Sovietologists to see them all as being essentially divided into
two quite separate social groups: the privileged bureaucracy (the ruling class or the nomenklatura) and the people (civil society) (Dembinski, 1991). In the former Soviet Union, the old party elite, the nomenklatura, was extraordinarily strong, whereas civil society was weak
and rules of law were all but absent. Today, because of a strong bureaucratic governance process, competition and the right for free entry is very difficult for nonmembers of the former ruling elite.
The nomenklatura made up of former high ranking party bosses,
directors of former state enterprises, and high-ranking members of
the government and its ministries still have considerable power. In
the struggle for profit opportunities, in-group members with efficient
social structures for the enforcement of certain norms of behavior
have a distinct competitive advantage over out-group members in
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appropriating and maintaining entrepreneurial roles. Thus, nomenklatura networks became a substitute for an adequate legal system
and helped facilitate the old ruling class into a powerful position in
entrepreneurial development. In fact, Johnson and Loveman (1995)
have found that about a third of Polish entrepreneurs formerly held a
high-level position in the state sector. The number seems to be higher
in Central Asia.
Financial Infrastructure and Criminalization of the Economy
An unstable political structure and the absence of an adequate legal
framework have resulted in the underdevelopment of financial markets, which are recognized as a necessary precondition for successful privatization and entrepreneurial development. New small private
businesses lack the legitimacy and necessary political backing to enjoy reliable access to capital. They must depend on private - and often informal or criminal - sources of credit, which are limited and are
only available at substantially higher interest rates. The lender has almost no legal protection or legal means of enforcing repayment of a
loan. The results of a 1996 survey of 1628 small businesses in Russia
showed that more than 70% had experienced financial problems in
the start-up, but only half of the businesses were able to obtain bank
loans (Veubas & Marzeeva, 1996). Russian banks ask 100–150% interest for ruble loans and 30% for hard currency (mainly U.S. dollars)
loans, which is prohibitive for most entrepreneurs. Thus, according
to the survey about one-fifth of small businesses in Moscow use private nonbank loans (Veubas & Marzeeva, 1996). The creation of a legal
framework for private lending would help to effectively use available
savings of the population and substantially curb the “black market”
financial transactions.
In just about any economic system, funds to support new businesses typically require financing from outside sources as well as the
use of personal funds. In former Soviet countries, the number of people capable of providing even partial funding for new ventures from
their own savings is limited to the members of the ruling elite of these
countries. In Kazakhstan, for example, in 1991 an average family had
savings of an equivalent to $50 at the “black market” rate. These unpretentious savings were almost completely lost in 1991–1993, as a result of hyperinflation that occurred in all the former Soviet republics.
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In a socialist redistributed economy, state banks and official sources
of credit generally offer loans more on the basis of political rather than
economic considerations. The legitimacy and legality of entrepreneurial development becomes a privilege that must be bought by illegal
bribes and expensive forms of compliance (Merrifield, 1991). Corruption and organized crime as alternative systems of protection to contractual agreements became more explicit during the period of transition to a market economy. Very often a new business has to pay to
both the government bureaucracy and the “underground forces” for
permission to enter the market and to stay in business. There are estimates that 70 to 80% of private businesses and commercial banks
in Russia make payoffs of 10 to 20% of their turnover to organized
crime (Nelson & Kuzes, 1995; Anderson, 1995). Therefore, economic
costs of doing business are so high that it is almost impossible to hope
for entrepreneurial development without a change in government policy and enforcement of curbing crime and corruption.
The Institute of Strategic Analysis and Development of Entrepreneurship in Russia and recent issues of The Economist report that a
substantial percentage of GDP is being produced by the underground
economy. Because bank financing is not available for this sector of the
economy, entrepreneurs use underground banks that charge 10% per
month interest and 30–40% per month for hard currency loans. The
role of transactions without payment of taxes is increasing. In 1994,
in Russia 32.6% of transactions were hidden from taxation, whereas
in 1996, 40.6% were (Veubas & Marzeeva, 1996). In Kazakhstan some
estimates indicate that 500 thousand to one million people are involved in the illegal operations of the “shadow economy.” These transactions are mostly found in cash trade sectors such as retail stores,
restaurants, and various services. According to the Ministry of the Interior of Kyrgyzstan, black market turnover increased from 21.5 million some (the Kyrgyz currency) in 1993 to 750 million some in 1995.
The President of the country declared in July 1995 that “merging of
criminal structures with state power has occurred. The Mafia influences all decisions, including governmental ones, through the corrupt
civil service” (Central Asia Monitor, 1996, p. 77).
In Kazakhstan, out of 31 billion, only 10 billion of Kazakh currency transactions goes through the banking system. The balance is
in “shadow” businesses and in the hands of the population (Central
Asia Monitor, 1995, p. 16).
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Cultural Environment
Entrepreneurship did not enjoy a high standing in the social values of the Russian empire (Armstrong, 1983). The Russian imperial
system placed a particularly strong emphasis on officially recognized
rank, where the access to higher ranks was traditionally achieved
by successful Russian Orthodox families. According to Armstrong
(1983), only the upper guild of merchants had status in some ways
comparable with that of noble landowners (as in most of Europe of
that time). In popular culture, persons involved in commerce were
held in low esteem. In addition, toward the end of the nineteenth
century, there was considerable disdain among the Russian intellectuals for narrow-minded, mostly war, profiteers. During the socialist regime, the antientrepreneurial climate was formed by the excision of peasant entrepreneurship in the 1930s (“dekulakization”),
the hierarchical division of labor and of centralized supply and procurement outside it, and the prohibition of almost all private economic activities.
For almost 50 years, the Soviet government provided its citizens with a comprehensive social safety net with universal access
to health care, education, and employment. A whole array of goods
and services (including housing and utilities) were provided either
free of charge or at subsidized prices. The population has come to
accept many features of this system as granted rights. Specific work
culture was formed that linked expected employment security with
a low level of effort, along with modest material expectations. One
of the most distinctive features of Soviet culture was the emphasis
on a nonsaving mentality. This is partly a result of a wasteful economy, soft budget constraints, and guaranteed employment and salary. What also did not help was the chronic inflation in the former
Soviet Union, where people became conditioned to buy things (also
because of constant shortages) rather than to save money. Current
hyperinflation just amplifies these problems. In other words, like
the political, economic, and legal environments, the cultural values
of transitional economies are not necessarily supporting entrepreneurial development.

L u t h a n s , S ta j k o v i c & S ta j k o v i c i n J o u r n a l o f W o r l d B u s i n e s s 3 5 ( 2 0 0 0 )

13

Social Cognition and Entrepreneurial Development
The difficult political, economic, legal, financial, criminal, and cultural environments facing entrepreneurs in transitional economies
are fairly visible and relatively easy to recognize.
However, what is not as obvious, and what has not been given much
attention in research or practice, is the psychological effect that can
affect the relationship between the hostile environment and entrepreneurial development. We believe that social cognitive theory can
provide needed psychological understanding of this relationship. The
external environment facing entrepreneurs in transitional economies
is a given and will continue to take a long time to improve. Instead
of lamenting on the difficult challenges imposed by the environment,
the time has come to determine and analyze what and how entrepreneurs can deal psychologically with this environment and turn threats
into opportunities.
Social cognitive theory would state that, even though much of human action is rooted in a social context (Bandura, 1997; Stajkovic &
Luthans, 1998a), the environment does not exert direct influence on
human action (Stajkovic & Sommer, 2000). This environment–behavior relationship is mediated by the social cognitive variables which determine what parts of the environment will be perceptually selected,
processed, and subsequently attended to in behavioral terms (Bandura, 1986). Thus, we propose that social cognitive theory can help
explain and provide insights as to how cognitive processes can help
cope with the hostile environment in entrepreneurial development.
Specifically, social cognitive theory would postulate that entrepreneurial action is determined by the triadic process-oriented relationships
between the environment, cognitive variables, and previous successful or unsuccessful entrepreneurial behaviors. Fig. 1 shows our model.
Major Premises
Social Cognition
The social part in social cognitive interpretations postulates that the
transitionary entrepreneur’s behavior is originated in and based on the
environment (because no behavior exists in a vacuum) described in
the first part of the article. However, the cognitive part specifies that
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Fig. 1. Triadic Influences in Social Cognitive Theory Applied to Entrepreneurial Development in Transitional Economies.

although entrepreneurial action finds its roots in the external environment, each entrepreneur also cognitively processes what environmental variables to select, analyze, and pursue. Social cognitive theory would specify that each individual entrepreneur, no matter the
circumstances, has unique ways of perceptual selection of environmental variables based on personal cognitive facilities. In other words,
there will always be individual differences among entrepreneurs as
to how they process and subsequently react to a hostile environment.
Triadic Relationship
The triadic relationships shown in Fig. 1 among the environment,
social cognition, and previous successful or unsuccessful entrepreneurial behavior is based on the premise that all three factors influence each other simultaneously (Bandura, 1986; Stajkovic & Luthans,
1998b). However, this three way interaction is conceptualized as three
two-way influences between any two factors (e.g., environment and
social cognition) that affect each other bidirectionally. It should also be
noted that the magnitude of the influences operates in an asymmetric
manner whereby any one combination of the bidirectional influences
may be stronger or weaker than the other two depending on different circumstances, entrepreneurs, and business ventures in question.
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Cognitive Processes
For explanatory purposes, the theory proposed here also specifies
the cognitive processes through which the triadic relationship is operationalized. Social cognitive theory states that cognitive interaction
with an environment is achieved through the five processes of symbolic selectivity, vicarious learning, forethought, self-regulation, and
self-reflection (Bandura, 1986; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998b). These
processes lead in a cognitive way to subsequent entrepreneurial selfregulation. In other words, entrepreneurs in transitionary economies
are not just reacting automatically to their hostile environments. Instead, depending on their cognitive processing of their environment,
they may act independent of the perceived environment in an autonomous, self-regulatory manner.
Symbolic selectivity refers to cognitive processes where the entrepreneur would internalize visual experiences (symbols) into cognitive
models that serves as guides or motivators of future actions. Through
forethought, entrepreneurs would cognitively examine the likely consequences of their future actions, plan courses of actions for the future, and set goals for themselves. Importantly, this human capacity to learn by observation would enable entrepreneurs to learn from
other model entrepreneurs (e.g., in the West) without having to acquire model behaviors by risky trial and error.
The self-regulatory capability of transitionary entrepreneurs is
based on the premise that entrepreneurial behavior is initiated and
regulated by evaluative reactions to the discrepancy between self-set
standards and entrepreneurial action. Finally, the transitionary entrepreneurs would use the self-reflective capability to think about
and analyze their past experiences, through which they may generate
new knowledge for the future. Perhaps the most important knowledge
these entrepreneurs can derive from self-reflection is the personal
judgment of their capabilities to deal effectively with the realities of
their hostile environment they are currently faced with.
Self-efficacy
The Nature of the Construct
The above noted expectations of successfully coping with the environment, in spite of potential difficulties, and about being able to
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establish new ventures are referred to in social cognitive theory as
self-efficacy beliefs. Such self-efficacy represents a personal judgment
as to how strongly entrepreneurs believe that they can master the necessary cognitive, memory processing, and behavioral facilities to deal
effectively with the environment and the specific entrepreneurial venture. We propose that self-efficacy is a major cognitive variable in the
functioning of any entrepreneur (see also Boyd & Vozikis, 1994; Chandler & Jansen, 1992; Gartner, 1992; Krueger & Brazeal, 1994), but is
especially relevant and important in transitionary economies. This
is because self-efficacy is a key variable in determining if and how
much effort the transitionary entrepreneur will extend on the venture, and how long that effort will be sustained in terms of cognitive
and behavioral persistence, especially in light of the severe environmental obstacles.
Needed Social and Educational Support
Besides predicting entrepreneurial performance, self-efficacy can
also be used to determine entrepreneurial avoidance (Chen, Greene,
& Crick, 1998). In particular, many individuals in transitional economies may have a desire to pursue new ventures, but are not engaging in necessary entrepreneurial activities not because they do not
have the requisite ability, knowledge, and skills but because they do
not believe they do. This aspect of self-efficacy in entrepreneurship
can also have social implications where training efforts would be directed not only to improving the actual knowledge base and behavioral
facilities but also to increasing the beliefs of potential entrepreneurs
as to what they can do with what they already have. This line of social support for entrepreneurial development can especially be useful
for women and older people in transitional economies who have traditionally been perceived as not having had the necessary entrepreneurial background (Chen et al. 1998).
Removal of entrepreneurial self-doubt and increase in self-efficacy,
especially under the constant environmental frustrations in transitional economies, will not necessarily happen on its own and over
night. Social support, in terms of government and community efforts, should be organized and geared toward designing an effective
entrepreneurial educational system. Specifically, the system should
be set up in place where both aspiring and less confident potential
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entrepreneurs would be provided with classes focusing on both necessary skills and self-efficacy building. These programs would thus
have a dual purpose: (1) to address the necessary behavioral facilities
for entrepreneurship, and subsequently determine potential entrepreneurs, and (2) to focus on creating a self-efficacy enhancing entrepreneurial environment, and, as a result, foster entrepreneurial potential.
In other words, we suggest that emergence of potential entrepreneurs
in transitional economies depends on the entrepreneurial potential of
the society, which is, in turn, largely a function of systematic effort on
developing entrepreneurial self-efficacy. This is because, as Bandura
(1986) puts it, nothing is as debilitating to successful human functioning as persistent self-doubt.
The Need for Formal Entrepreneurial Programs
We recommend the establishment of formal entrepreneurial training and educational opportunities in transitional economies. This proactive stance is necessary because we believe there is a distinction between intentional and nonintentional entrepreneurial experiences.
The intentional experience gained through formal programs involves
purposive and volitional goal-bound activities toward entrepreneurial development, which, if executed successfully, would, importantly,
lead to an increase in entrepreneurial self-efficacy. The currently most
common non-intentional activities represent random occurrences of
scattered entrepreneurial actions, whose outcomes are likely to be attributed to external influences (e.g., luck, good fortune, or especially
in transitional economies having the “right,” usually criminal, connections). According to social cognitive theory, these external attributions do not necessary translate into higher self-efficacy (Stajkovic &
Sommer, 2000). Thus, there would seem to be a high return in transitional countries from investing in formal entrepreneurial programs
that build the efficacy of participants.

Conclusion
Theories of entrepreneurship offered in the growing literature have
mainly focused on one-sided determinism, where either environmental or personality variables have been specified as unique predictors of
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entrepreneurial action. Taken separately, both approaches have generally failed to capture the complexity of human action that encompasses the interaction of environmental, cognitive, and behavioral
variables (Bandura, 1986, 1997; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998a, 1998b).
By applying social cognitive theory to entrepreneurship, we believe
that a much better understanding of the relationship between the environment and entrepreneurial development in transitional economies can be achieved. Too often the harsh reality of the environment
in these countries simply dismisses the possibility of successful entrepreneurial development. We would suggest and have demonstrated
that a psychological perspective through social cognitive theory in
general and self-efficacy in particular can lead to not only better understanding, but also more effective development and practice of entrepreneurship in transitional economies, such as in Central Asia.
Because entrepreneurial development in postcommunist countries
is still at an early stage, the profile of the environment facing entrepreneurs in Central Asia, and doing something about it for more rapid
and successful entrepreneurial development, remains important. Unfortunately, the entrepreneurial development activities that are taking shape at the grass roots throughout the former Soviet countries is
characterized by a short-term perspective. There is a preference for
trading activities over production, and is often associated with the
rise of crime and corruption. Entrepreneurs face great uncertainties
due to the continuing instability of fundamental rules of the market
economy paradigm.
Yet, despite this definite impact of the environment, we would suggest that social cognitive theory variables such as self-efficacy may
predict that individual entrepreneurs may be able to overcome environmental threats and turn them into opportunities. Unlike personality traits, self-efficacy can be developed through training and modeling (Gist, 1989; Gist, Schwoerer, & Rosen, 1989). Instead of hoping
for a massive capital infusion to improve the environment, transitional
economies may be well advised into doing things like implementing
formal self-efficacy programs to foster individual initiative for entrepreneurial development.
For the future, the content of such programs needs to be developed
and tested.
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